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DIVIDED SUFFRAGE 
Jeffrey Rosen* 
The biggest constitutional mistake? As the recent wave of 
constitution-making in Eastern Europe suggests, future Solons 
and Lycurguses aren't likely to be very interested in quibbling 
over the details of a Bill of Rights. Instead, the critical question 
is how to structure democratic elections. And on this point, the 
most misguided provision in the U.S. Constitution is not the 
Electoral College, which remains theoretically mystifying but 
hasn't bothered anyone for more than a century. Far worse are 
sections 2 and 4 of Article I, and (if I'm allowed more than one 
villain) section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which divide re-
sponsibility for defining the nature and scope of suffrage between 
Congress and the states. This unfortunate compromise, more 
than any other, is responsible for all the most traumatic electoral 
crises since Reconstruction. 
"To have reduced the different qualifications in the different 
States to one uniform rule would probably have been as dissatis-
factory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the 
convention," Madison explained apologetically in Federalist 52. 
Allowing the states to restrict the suffrage in different ways was 
the only politically feasible compromise, because "it cannot be 
feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their 
constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to 
them by the federal Constitution." 
But of course, abridging federal constitutional rights is pre-
cisely what the states proceeded to do in their decisions restrict-
ing the suffrage in the nineteenth century and manipulating 
electoral districts in the twentieth. Maybe there was some logic 
for allowing states to exclude broad classes of voters in 1789, 
when only propertied, educated citizens were thought capable of 
casting informed votes; but in an age when uniform as well as 
universal suffrage has been embraced as a national ideal, it 
makes little sense to tolerate a patchwork of inconsistent and pa-
rochial state restrictions. 
• Legal Affairs Editor, The New Republic. 
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More fundamentally, the constitutional tragedy of the post-
Reconstruction era-the subversion of African American suf-
frage by the states-could have been avoided if the Reconstruc-
tion Republicans had granted Congress plenary control over the 
franchise, as Senator Jacob Howard and Congressman George 
Boutwell proposed. Imagine how the racial politics of the next 
century might have been transformed if the Committee on Re-
construction had endorsed Boutwell's draft of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ("Congress shall have the power to abolish any dis-
tinction in the exercise of the elective franchise in any State, 
which by law, regulation or usage may exist therein"), or How-
ard's draft ("Congress shall have power to make all laws neces-
sary and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States in 
each State the same political and elective rights and privi-
leges .... ").1 Instead, by refusing to displace the states' control 
over the franchise, and by compounding the error with section 2 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction Congress 
paved the way for the nullification of the Fifteenth Amendment 
in the 1890s, as defiant states restricted black suffrage with liter-
acy tests, grandfather clauses, dual registration requirements, and 
so forth. 
Similarly, the great redistricting crises of the twentieth cen-
tury-malapportionment, partisan gerrymandering, and the con-
fusion over race-conscious districting-might have been avoided 
or moderated if States had been stripped of their powers to draw 
congressional districts. The pressures on redistricting were not 
apparent until the rapid population growth after 1850, when the 
contrast between city and country became increasingly dramatic. 
But gross malapportionment might have been less likely to per-
sist for more than a century if landed interests hadn't been free 
to lobby self-interested state legislators, with the results that 
Hamilton predicted in Federalist 60. And, the implementation of 
the Voting Rights Act might have been less tortured if self-inter-
ested state legislators hadn't been free to balance the irreconcila-
ble goals of incumbency protection and proportionate racial 
representation with the inflexible requirements of population 
based districting. 
The solution for future constitution makers? Giving Con-
gress exclusive control over the franchise wouldn't entirely solve 
the problem, since the siren calls of self-dealing and incumbency 
protection would still be hard to resist. What's needed is to tie 
1. Benjamin B. Kendrick, The JoU1711ll of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Recon· 
struction 54-55 (Colum. U. Press, 1914). 
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Ulysses to the mast with some kind of pre-commitment strategy. 
Perhaps the solution would be to delegate power over suffrage 
and districting to an administrative body that is less vulnerable to 
partisan interests. One model is the independent commission re-
sponsible for making recommendations to Congress about mili-
tary base closings, whose recommendations must be accepted or 
rejected as a package. Another is the Federal Reapportionment 
Act of 1929, which charged the President with reporting to Con-
gress the state-by-state results of the decennial census, together 
with strictly a numerical apportionment of representatives, and 
delegated responsibility for certifying the apportionment to the 
clerk of the House of Representatives.2 
Should the national election laws be constitutionalized? "It 
will not be alleged that an election law could have been framed 
and inserted in the Constitution which would have been applica-
ble to every probable change in the situation of the country," 
Hamilton said in Federalist 59. But why not? Today, many coun-
tries have inserted election laws into their constitutions, includ-
ing Australia, Belgium, Canada, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland.3 
The best argument against constitutionalizing the national elec-
tion laws is that the national legislature should be free to experi-
ment with proportional and mixed representation systems; and 
experimentation is more difficult once the laws are entrenched. 
So perhaps the institutional arrangements for adopting and 
amending election laws, but not the laws themselves, should be 
specified in the Constitution. Blue Ribbon commissions, fast 
track legislation-there are plenty of possibilities. Just make 
sure to exclude the states as ruthlessly as possible. 
2. See, e.g., Samuel lssacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Re-
view of Political Fairness, 71 Tex. L Rev. 1643, 1665 (1993). 
3. Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Repon on the Consti-
tutional Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. Chi. L Rev. 595, 622 & n. 51 (1991). 
